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h i g h l i g h t s
• Institutions matter for fiscal decentralization (FD) to achieve fiscal discipline.
• Fiscal rules (FR) are hypothesized to enhance the effectiveness of FD.
• Panel evidence show that the negative effect of FD on deficits increases with FR.
• Balanced-budget and expenditure rules enhance FD’s effectiveness.
• Debt rules have a direct negative effect on deficits.
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a b s t r a c t
Fiscal decentralization (FD) and fiscal rules (FR) are institutional mechanisms that are implemented by
varying degrees in increasing number of countries. This paper investigates empirically the effect of FR
on the effectiveness of FD in achieving fiscal discipline. Panel evidence strongly supports that balanced
budget and expenditure rules help FD to achieve this goal, while debt rule has a direct disciplinary effect.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization (FD) is an institutional mechanism that
ideally helps to reveal preferences of local citizens and, hence,
facilitates effective local public good provision via increased
transparency and accountability. The potential benefits of FD
have been studied widely following the seminal work of Oates
(1972). Tanzi (2000, 2008) argues that structural and institutional
conditions, particularly the country size and governance quality,
affect the potential effectiveness of FD. Recent empirical studies
have also reached a near-consensus that the positive effects of FD
hinge upon the level of institutional and economic development
(see, for example, De Mello, 2000; King and Ma, 2001; Neyapti,
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.0062004, 2010; Zhang, 2006; Adam et al., 2008; Bouton et al., 2008;
Kyriacou and Sagales, 2009). This explains why earlier studies
presented mixed evidence on the macroeconomic benefits (often
focusing on growth or efficiency) of FD (see, for example, Treisman,
2000; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Jin and Zou, 2002; Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab, 2006).
The absence of a supportive institutional environment, how-
ever, hinders FD’s effectiveness in achieving allocational and
distributional efficiency.When large horizontal and vertical imbal-
ances exist and local governments do not face sufficient incentives
to internalize the burden of local spending, FD often fails to deliver
its objectives. If fiscal policy guidelines and rules are not well de-
fined or enforced at the aggregate level, decentralizing spending
and revenue collection fails to deliver fiscal discipline. Duly, recent
theoretical studies emphasize the important role that fiscal rules
(FR) play for FD to attain the desired welfare gains. More specifi-
cally, they point at the role of rule-based transfer mechanisms and
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ment efficiency (see, for example, Sanguinetti and Tomassi, 2004;
Stowhase and Traxler, 2005; Akin et al., 2011).
Recent studies document the state of FR around the world and
highlight the importance of rule-based fiscal mechanisms in im-
proving fiscal outcomes.1 Schaechter et al. (2012) point out that an
increasing number of countries have adopted FR, and the signifi-
cant role of crises on this trend. Budina et al. (2012) observe a neg-
ative relationship between FR and public debt. Litschig (2012) and
Wyplosz (2012), on the other hand, caution about the manipula-
bility of FR, indicating that rules without strong institutional back-
ing and enforcement characteristicswould not yield their intended
goals; in particular, too strict rules are argued to be associatedwith
weaknesses during implementation.
In view of the above, this paper presents an original empirical
test of the hypothesis that FR play a significant role in the effec-
tiveness of FD. Using the recent panel datasets on FD and FR, and
controlling for the relevant structural and institutional characteris-
tics, the hypothesis is tested for both expenditure and revenue de-
centralization. The empirical evidence indicate that balance budget
rules, their formal enforcement procedures, and expenditure rules
contribute to the effectiveness of FD in achieving fiscal discipline,
while debt rules have a direct effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model and the data sources that are utilized in testing the
above stated hypothesis. Section 3 reports the findings and, finally,
Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and model specification
We consider that the primary objective of FD is fiscal discipline.
The hypothesis tested here is that the effectiveness of FD in
attaining fiscal discipline, measured by budget deficits, increases
with the presence of fiscal policy rules. We employ the most
recent and extensive panel data on FD (expenditure and revenue
decentralization, denoted by FDexp and FDRev, respectively)
provided by the World Bank.2 The source of data on FR is the IMF,
which, based on formal and objective evaluation criteria, classifies
FR as balanced budget (BBR); debt (DR); expenditure (ER); and
revenue (RR) rules.3
To test the hypothesis that FR enhances the effectiveness of FD,
consider the following regression model:
Def it = a+ bDef it−1 + cFDit + dFRit + eFRit ∗ FDit + fZit + εit
where the subscript it represents the country (i)–year (t) obser-
vations, and Def is the ratio of budget deficits to GDP. Z represents
the set of control variables used commonly in the related literature,
namely the government size (G, measured as the share of overall
government spending in GDP), rate of economic growth (gr, mea-
sured as the percentage change in real GDP), governance (gov); and
1 Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) discuss the benefits of FR for US budgeting. While
Ma (1997) discusses the pros and cons of different fiscal transfer rules, Shah
(2006) discusses the pros and cons of different agent types in charge of designing
institutions, which govern fiscal grants.
2 Various studies have pointed out the problems related to a consistent
measurement of FD across countries (see, for example, Dziobek et al., 2011
and Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2009). We use the cash-based shares of
subnational government expenditures and revenues, published online by theWorld
Bank (2012).
3 The FR dataset is composed of de jure numerical targets that have a minimum
coverage of central government. Appendix provides the common set of countries,
for which data on FR and the enforcement dummies (source: IMF, Fiscal Rules
Dataset 2012) and the FD are both available.the country size (measured by the log of population: Log(pop)).4
The rationale for these controls is as follows. Large governments
can be associated with low fiscal discipline, hence G is expected to
have a positive effect on deficits; gr accounts for business cycles
and is expected to have a negative association with deficits that
tend to be counter-cyclical. By the very nature of its measurement
criteria,5 gov is expected to be negatively associated with deficits.
pop is a proxy for the heterogeneity in preferences that is one of
the justifications for FD6; since heterogeneity may also worsen the
common pool problem and increase budgetary imbalances, how-
ever, we do not have a strong prior on the sign of this variable.
The main hypothesis of the paper states that FD itself may not be
negative or significant (see, for example, Thiessen, 2003; Neyapti,
2010); given the possible nonlinear effects of FD we use it in logs
to test this hypothesis.
Our null hypothesis is that it is not necessarily c or d, but it is
e that is significantly negative in the above model; that is, FDmay
not achieve fiscal discipline if FR are not in place. In addition to the
interactions between FD and FR, we also report the interactions of
FR with a dummy variable that stands for the legal enforcement
of FR: Enforce.7 Given the autoregressive structure of deficits, the
estimation involves the lagged values of Def.
The model is estimated using an unbalanced panel with a to-
tal of 137 observations.8 The estimation of the above model calls
for several cautions. First, the presence of the lagged dependent
variable renders the use of fixed or random effects inappropriate
due to the violation of the assumption of exogenous covariates.9
Second, pooled OLS estimation is inconsistent if there are individ-
ual effects. The appropriate method therefore appears to be the
dynamic panel data estimation with GMM instruments (AB-DPD),
which yields consistent estimates (see Arellano and Bond, 1991).
We also utilize this even though the use of the method reduces the
number of observations to 34.
3. Estimation results
As a preliminary,we investigatewhether there is any significant
difference in sample average Def before and after the implemen-
tation of (any type of) FR; we find that the answer is no.10 We next
turn to the regression analysis to assess, in addition to the direct
effect of FR on Def, its indirect effect via its impact on the effective-
ness of FD.
4 World Bank indicators of governance cover control of corruption, government
effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and
voice and accountability.
5 We measure gov by averaging the six indices of governance (see Kaufmann
et al., 2010): control of corruption; rule of law; political instability; governmental
efficiency; voice and accountability; and regulatory quality.
6 See Neyapti (2010) for empirical evidence of the significant effect of pop on the
effectiveness of FD.
7 We define Enforce as the sumof the enforcement dummies pertaining to all four
types of rules provided in the FR-dataset (IMF) to account for its presence at large.
8 The cross section composition iswell-balancedwith eight transition economies,
10 developed and seven less developed countries. Descriptive statistics of the data
is reported as follows:
DEF GR gov G FDexp FDrev log(pop)
Mean 0.91 3.49 0.40 27.48 28.40 24.48 16.43
Std. dev. 3.68 5.41 0.26 10.17 16.60 14.24 1.92
Maximum 16.9 15.8 0.86 51.76 60.30 53.20 20.90
Minimum −19.5 −21.3 0.08 9.92 1.37 1.11 12.52
9 See, for example, Greene (2011).
10 Two years’ averages are considered to maximize the number of observations
before and after the adoption of a fiscal rule, leading to 65 and 53 observations,
530 B. Neyapti / Economics Letters 121 (2013) 528–532Table 1
Arellano–Bond estimates with robust errors (dependent variable: Def = Deficits/GDP).
FR-type: With FDexp With FDrev
BBR ER DR BBR ER DR
Def (-1) 0.11 0.12*** 0.19*** 3.35*** 0.13** 1.89***
(1.28) (2.3) (3.8) (5.9) (2.17) (3.2)
FR 0.20*** 0.59*** −0.073*** 0.18*** −0.24* −0.06***
(3.13) (4.3) (−12.01) (3.1) −(1.9) −(12.2)
Enforce*FR −0.17*** (Dropped) (Dropped) −1.37** (Dropped) (Dropped)
−(2.4) −(2.1)
FD 0.04** 0.02*** 0.003 3.89*** 0.03*** 0.01
(2.1) (2.9) (0.2) (8.5) (3.9) (0.8)
FD*FR −0.05*** −0.02*** 0.02*** −4.83*** 5.75* 0.15***
−(3.1) −(4.3) (8.3) −(3.1) (1.9) (8.4)
G 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.71*** 0.001*** 0.01***
(4.3) (4.2) (16.4) (4.3) (4.2) (17.2)
gr −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.198*** −0.12*** −0.001*** −0.002***
−(3.1) −(3.1) −(7.5) −(3.2) −(3.3) −(7)
Gov 0.02 −0.005 3.565 0.05 −0.04 3.67
(0.2) −(0.1) (0.43) (0.5) −(0.4) (0.39)
Log(pop) −0.2*** −0.14*** −10.41*** −0.21*** −0.24*** −0.12***
−(3.07) (−2.84) (−2.95) −(5.8) (−3.57) −(3.4)
C −3.22*** 2.18*** 1.64*** 3.36*** 4.06*** 1.89***
(−2.96) (2.49) (2.9) (5.9) (3.7) −(3.2)
Wald chi2(5) 603*** 22592*** 1861*** 148*** 700*** 4636***
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the t-ratios.
* Indicate significance at 10% levels.
** Indicate significance at 5% levels.
*** Indicate significance at 1% levels.Table 1 reports the results of the AB-DPD estimations with
robust errors, using the alternative measurements of both FD and
FR. The instrument list is composed of the GMM instruments
of the covariates besides the polity index, which is considered
exogenous.11 The table shows that besides the lagged deficits term
that exhibits significant persistence, some of our control variables
are consistently significant with the expected sign: while G has
significant positive effect on budget deficits, gr has a significant
negative effect on Def. gov is not significant probably because FD,
FR and Enforcemay already be capturing the effects of governance
quality. The negative significance of pop possibly reflects the effect
of other country-specific or trend elements, given this variable’s
relative persistence over the limited time dimension in a given
country.
The main finding that provides support for the hypothesis of
this paper is the interactive effect of FD and FR, which is negative
and significant in the case FR = {BBR, ER}when used with expen-
diture decentralization.DR, however, has a direct effect onDef that
is negative and significant, when used along with both FD types.
When the model is estimated using revenue decentralization, the
hypothesis is supported only in the case of BBR, although the di-
rect effects of DR and ER are also negative and significant.12 Given
respectively.
Before After
Def FDrev FDexp Def FDrev FDexp
Mean −1.15 26.32 61.90 −1.09 27.83 62.88
Stdev 15.7 248.1 493.8 12.3 218.8 525.9
No of obs 53 56 53 65 42 41
Difference t-ratio 0.011 0.484 0.209
11 Politymeasures the extent of democracy (source: Polity IV Database, Center for
Systemic Peace).
12 Estimation cannot be performed for the case of FR= RR due to insufficient data
size (see the Appendix).the hypothesis of the paper, the mostly positive and significant di-
rect effects on Def of both FDexp and FDrev should not come as a
surprise; they indicate that FD generally fails to achieve fiscal dis-
cipline in the absence of FR. The coefficients of the interactions be-
tween FR and the Enforce dummy are negative and significant for
FR = BBR in the cases of both FDexp and FDrev, while this interac-
tion term is dropped due to collinearity for estimations using the
rest of the FR terms.
The above findings are in support of the recent literature that
stresses the important role of fiscal institutions for the effective-
ness of FD in delivering economic efficiency. It further presents
original empirical evidence on the significant role of the centrally
imposed budget constraints and debt rules, aswell as the existence
of fiscal rule enforcement procedures, in reaping the benefits of
FD.13
4. Conclusions
Recent literature suggests that the effectiveness of FD in deliver-
ing fiscal efficiency depends on structural and institutional charac-
teristics of a country. Using recent panel datasets of FR and FD, this
paper presents original evidence on the significant interactive ef-
fects of these variables on budget deficits. The evidence presented
here indicate that the effectiveness of both expenditure and rev-
enue decentralization on reducing budget deficits significantly de-
pends on the existence of FR, particularly balanced-budget rules.
Debt rules, on the other hand, have significant direct effects on fis-
cal discipline. While the current findings are based on a limited
sample, they pose important policy advice for fiscal institutional
design: countries that intend to decentralize their fiscal activities
can increase their fiscal efficiency with the proviso that they also
adopt FR and improve their enforcement procedures.
13 A theoretical model developed by Akin et al. (2011) demonstrates the
importance of budget rules for the efficiency of FD.
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Dummies for FR and enforcement by country–year observations. (cc stands for country codes, yr are the enactment years of FR; source: IMF).
cc yr BBR Enforce cc yr DR Enforce cc yr ER Enforce cc yr RR Enforce
ARG 2000 1 1 ARM 2008 1 0 ARG 2000 1 1 AUS 1998 1 0
AUS 1998 1 0 AUS 1998 1 0 AUS 1985 1 1 AUS 1985 1 1
AUS 1985 1 1 AUT 1995 1 na BEL 1993 1 1 BEL 1992 1 na
AUT 1995 1 1 BEL 1992 1 na BEL 1995 1 1 BEL 1999 1 1
BEL 1992 1 na BEL 1999 1 na BEL 1996 1 1 BEL 1993 1 na
BEL 1999 1 na BEL 1993 1 na BEL 1998 1 1 BEL 1995 1 1
BEL 1993 1 na BEL 1995 1 na BGR 2006 1 0 BEL 1996 1 1
BEL 1995 1 na BEL 1996 1 na BRA 2000 1 1 BEL 1998 1 1
BEL 1996 1 na BEL 1998 1 na BWA 2003 1 0 DNK 2001 1 0
BEL 1998 1 na BGR 2006 1 1 CAN 1998 1 0 DNK 2007 1 0
BGR 2006 1 0 BGR 2003 1 1 DEU 1992 1 0 DNK 2009 1 0
CAN 1998 1 0 BRA 2000 1 1 DEU 2008 1 0 FRA 2006 1 0
CHE 2003 1 1 CAN 1998 1 0 DNK 1994 1 0 KEN 1997 1 0
COG 2002 1 na COG 2002 1 na DNK 2001 1 0 LTU 2008 1 1
COG 2008 1 na COG 2008 1 na DNK 2007 1 0 NLD 1994 1 1
CPV 1998 1 0 CPV 1998 1 0 DNK 2009 1 0
CZE 2004 1 na CZE 2004 1 na FIN 2003 1 0
DEU 1992 1 0 DEU 1992 1 na FIN 2007 1 0
DEU 2008 1 0 DEU 2008 1 na FRA 1998 1 0
DNK 1994 1 0 DNK 1992 1 na FRA 2006 1 0
DNK 2001 1 0 DNK 1994 1 na ISL 2004 1 0
DNK 2007 1 0 DNK 2001 1 na ISR 2005 1 0
DNK 2009 1 0 DNK 2007 1 na LTU 2008 1 1
DNK 1992 1 0 DNK 2009 1 na LUX 1990 1 0
DOM 1998 1 na DOM 1998 1 na LUX 1992 1 0
ESP 1992 1 na DOM 2006 1 na LUX 2004 1 0
ESP 2003 1 0 ESP 1992 1 na NLD 1994 1 1
ESP 2006 1 0 ESP 2003 1 na PER 2000 1 0
EST 1993 1 1 ESP 2006 1 na PER 2003 1 0
EST 2004 1 1 EST 2004 1 na SWE 1997 1 0
FIN 2003 1 0 FIN 1995 1 0 SWE 2000 1 0
FIN 2007 1 0 FIN 1999 1 0 USA 1999 1 1
FIN 1995 1 na FIN 2003 1 0 USA 2002 1 1
FIN 1999 1 0 FIN 2007 1 na
FRA 1998 1 na FRA 1992 1 na
FRA 2006 1 na FRA 1998 1 na
FRA 1992 1 na FRA 2006 1 na
GBR 1992 1 na GBR 1992 1 na
GBR 1997 1 0 GBR 1997 1 0
GRC 1992 1 na GRC 1992 1 na
HUN 2004 1 0 HUN 2004 1 na
IDN 2004 1 0 IDN 2004 1 0
IND 2004 1 0 IRL 1992 1 na
IRL 1992 1 na KEN 1997 1 0
ISR 2005 1 0 LKA 2003 1 0
ISR 1992 1 0 LTU 2004 1 0
JPN 1997 1 0 LTU 2008 1 0
JPN 1998 1 0 LTU 1997 1 0
LKA 2003 1 0 LUX 1992 1 0
LTU 2008 1 na LUX 2004 1 0
LTU 2004 1 na LUX 1990 1 0
LUX 1992 1 na MLT 2004 1 na
LUX 2004 1 na MUS 2008 1 1
MEX 2006 1 1 NLD 1992 1 na
MLT 2004 1 na NLD 1994 1 na
NLD 1994 1 na NZL 1994 1 0
NLD 1992 1 na PAN 2002 1 0
NOR 2001 1 0 POL 2004 1 1
NZL 1994 1 0 POL 2006 1 1
PAN 2002 1 0 POL 2008 1 1
PER 2000 1 1 POL 1999 1 1
PER 2003 1 1 PRT 1992 1 0
POL 2004 1 na ROM 2007 1 na
POL 2006 1 0 SVK 2004 1 na
POL 2008 1 na SVN 2004 1 0
PRT 1992 1 na SVN 2005 1 na
ROM 2007 1 na SVN 2000 1 0
SVK 2004 1 na SWE 1995 1 na
SVN 2004 1 na SWE 1997 1 na
SVN 2005 1 na SWE 2000 1 na
SWE 1997 1 na
SWE 2000 1 0
SWE 1995 1 na
USA 1986 1 1
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